QB Draft Series 2018: Addressing the Elephant in the QB Room

A few weeks ago, two black men were arrested in a Philadelphia Starbucks for nothing more than the crime of being black. Everybody involved quickly realized that what had occurred was an incident of implicit racial bias.

Many people have asked me why I “have to bring race into everything”. Ignoring the elephant in the room does not make it go away. I know that many people will read this, ignore the links, ignore the evidence, and call me names for even suggesting any of this. That will not make any of this less true, nor does it mean it should be ignored.

Racism and America is one of those iconic duos. It’s why even collections of kids cartoons have to come with an explanation of their racism. It’s why the MLB has a Jackie Robinson Day. It’s why Title VII and numerous state laws exist prohibiting racism and why the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has so many cases. I could give thousands of examples here.

The NFL has its own racist history. From 1934-1946, no black players played in the league, in part because owners and coaches claim they just weren’t good enough despite them having proved themselves previously (sound familiar?). The history of black QBs in the NFL is largely one of a lack of opportunities. Many NFL teams did not have a black QB start for them until the late 90s or early 2000s, and the Giants’ saw their first black starter at QB ever just last season when Geno Smith started a game for them. Also, though it’s not about blacks, there’s still a team named the Redskins. That’s not even hidden.

I would be remiss if I did not at least mention the Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid situations. These are two guys who are unquestionably NFL starters, but are being blackballed for speaking out against race discrimination by people who are not part of the NFL. To the extent that people are saying they’re not good enough for the NFL on pure talent, it’s so obviously false (Kaepernick has a career passer rating of 88.9 – better than league average, averages 6 yards per carry, and has a 4-2 playoff record, better than guys like Phil Rivers and Matt Stafford by a wide margin; Reid is a 26 year old former pro bowler who has been remarkably consistent throughout his career) as to not merit any real discussion. But because they bring in all sorts of other issues beyond just straight “they are being discussed differently because of their skin color”, they are an (important) issue all their own.

Many will be quick to point out that most of the NFL is black, and this is undeniably true. In fact, I think that at some skill positions, there is bias against white players (especially at RB and WR). This is likely due to blacks being seen as bigger and stronger than they actually are. As size and strength are generally considered positive traits for non-QB positions, it is not a surprise then to see that blacks are favored in those positions. But for QBs, QBs need to be smart. Right? …Right?

How often has the refrain “QBs need to be intelligent” or “he’s not smart enough” come up? QBs absolutely need to be able to read defenses, process what he sees quickly, and make quick decisions. I don’t know about you, but I never learned any of those things in school. Quite frankly, I don’t see what any of those things have to do with intelligence. They are learned skills through years of practice, no different than getting good at video games or a musical instrument or learning a new language. If you took a random person out of a Masters degree classroom and stuck them on a football field, they would suck at it because it has nothing to do with things they are smart at. It is giving a tree exam to an elephant.

Which is why the Wonderlic exam has no relation to actual NFL anything. Have you actually taken a Wonderlic exam before? Here are two different ones you can try: 1, 2. I have taken many standardized tests in my life. I have taken multiple classes on how to take standardized tests. The Wonderlic is a standardized test. Standardized testing has a ton of problems. Standarized testing is also biased against minorities. They are assembled in a minority-biased way. Ryan Fitzpatrick, known for his high wonderlic score, doesn’t know his score and doesn’t see the relation between it and his football abilities. And again, there is a long history of race and intelligence being maliciously linked.

Studies have been done specifically about how people, both white and black, view black and white QBs. This is the type of implicit bias that truly affects how QBs are viewed. Given objective, explicit, controlled descriptions and pictures, with nothing else affecting the participants, the participants of these studies were still prone to stereotyping and bias. I am sure that most if not all of the participants were not explicitly racist. Yet their internalized ideas still manifested to the detriment of the black QBs.

Most likely, people don’t even realize that they’re being biased. People in all professions unconsciously discriminate based on race. And, much like the NFL Draft pre-draft process is one long job interview, one of the most insidious places implicit race discrimination appears is in interviews. It’s proven in resumes. It’s proven in names. For NFL QBs, it’s proven in scouting reports.

Why all this discussion for this draft? Well, we have one black QB who is being treated significantly differently in Lamar Jackson. Remember, the draft process started with NFL teams asking Jackson to play WR, a take so blindingly stupid it spurred Chris Long to rant on Twitter. The amount of coded language and double standards are so numerous it is difficult to keep track, though some people are trying. And while many people will cry out “it’s not racism, he’s just not that good”, the claim just doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. He played in a pro system with poor talent, with numbers suppressed because he suffered the most drops of any top QB prospect.

I’m not saying there’s no reason to criticize him – there is no such thing as a perfect prospect. But many of the criticisms – lack of accuracy because of low completion percentage, inability to operate in a pro-style system because he’s too quick to bail from the pocket – are so far from the truth, and, perhaps, more importantly, held against Jackson significantly more than they are held against other top prospects, that there really is only one explanation, and this is it.

On the other end of the spectrum is Josh Allen. Allen has been just as divisive as Lamar Jackson, with those in favor of him pointing out that he has a massive arm and great athleticism, and those wary of him pointing out that that’s really all he has right now. Similar prospects, such as Cardale “12 Gauge” Jones and Logan Thomas, were projected as 4th rounders and were drafted in the 4th. Cardale Jones’ tools were slightly behind Allen’s but he also put up a significantly better performance in college against significantly better competition. Logan Thomas had better athletic tools at a bigger size and put up slightly worse numbers against significantly better competition. There is simply nothing separating Allen from prospects like Jones and Thomas except for one thing: the color of his skin.

This type of QB prospect is rare to begin with prospects with a huge arm and a ton of athleticism come around once every two or three years, maybe even less often than that. But even more rarely do they come with white skin. That is where Josh Allen really outshines his comps. It is completely irrelevant to his projection. It is completely irrelevant to his success. But it is very, very relevant to his stock.

On a closing note, I want to point out how these types of biases could be affecting two other QB prospects this year. Cam Newton faces criticism and sets off a firestorm when he does something like arrogant struts and in your face taunting. Baker Mayfield is…well, “the six foot jerk”. His particular brand of arrogant taunting (and small stature) may have affected his draft stock quite a bit more if he was black, although it appears that they have both hurt his draft stock to some extent to begin with. And while it isn’t white and black with Josh Rosen, I could probably write a whole separate article about whether Rosen’s draft stock may be suffering (or benefiting) from being Jewish.

Okay, enough with this heavy talk, let’s move to talking about the QBs!

QB Draft Series 2018: Introduction/NFL vs. NBA Draft Scouting

Welcome to my 2018 NFL QB Scouting Series. For various reasons, I decided to jump into NFL Draft stuff this year.


It did not take long to realize that the NFL Draft is an entirely different beast than the NBA Draft. In fact, I think the only thing that I’ve found is similar is the biases that people display when talking about prospects. I wrote two separate articles on bad arguments and cognitive biases that apply just as well to the NFL Draft as they do to the NBA Draft – just replace the NBA players/prospects with NFL players/prospects and everything else can stay basically the same and apply just as well.

Before I get into the QBs, I wanted to highlight some of the biggest differences and similarities between scouting the NBA and NFL drafts.

There are no stats that can be easily relied upon

This is honestly the biggest difference by far. In the NBA, the first thing I do is get a spreadsheet with every draft-eligible player and cut out every player who doesn’t reach certain well-established statistical thresholds. Some of the stats I rely upon are actually fairly simple metrics – minutes played, shooting percentages, total points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks. They’re not perfect metrics, but good NBA players were typically also good NCAAB players. I also use some advanced metrics, many created by other draftniks. There is an entire community of analytically inclined NBA draftniks that do really good, really interesting work.

The NFL Draft? Not so much. There are a few reasons for this.

In basketball, there are 5 positions and every position has the same stats. The expected stats for the different positions may vary, but they can be compared both within position and to other positions. In the NFL, there are a ton of positions, many of which have different stats than others, few which can be compared against each other. It means that any statistical analysis has to be done on a much smaller fraction of the draft at a time.

In college basketball, the average player plays about 33 games, 1000+ minutes and something like 55-60 offensive and 55-60 defensive possessions every game. In college football, the average player plays about 12-13 games and is involved in anywhere from single digits (kickers and punters) to about 75 (offensive linemen) plays a game. In total, most guys just do not have a large enough sample to create reliable stats.

The level of competition and style of play can also vary wildly from game to game and conference to conference. As far as I’m aware, nobody has created a metric accounting for these differences. There’s also differences in systems, weather, and multiple other things that can affect stats but do not appear in them.

Overall, stats are, at best, an unreliable signpost. They can be used to help guide what to look for on tape, but that’s about all.

There are so so so many more draft-relevant players to the point of being overwhelming

In basketball, before I even jump into the tape, I’m already looking at a pool of 50-70 guys total. In the past 3 drafts, I ranked 13, 13, and 15 college prospects as potential starters and 35, 52, and 37 prospects total as prospects worth potentially drafting, with another 10-20 listed in each draft as potentially interesting UDFAs. In football, there’s over 250 picks vs. only 60 for the NBA and then another 10+ UDFAs per team vs. 2 or 3 per team in the NBA who are usually fighting for minor league roster spots. In the NBA draft, about half the players drafted get to play real minutes in the NBA and about a third turn into real NBA players, with only 1-3 becoming true stars.

Using the 2014 drafts for comparison, about 30 NBA drafted players played significant minutes and only 15 have averaged 25+ MPG in their career, with only 1 making an all-star game. 146 NFL drafted players have appeared in 32+ games, 77 spent 2+ years as their team’s primary starter, and 21 have already made the Pro Bowl.

Basically, there are well over 200 draft-relevant prospects, and if the ratios hold, somewhere between 250-300 prospects should be ranked at a minimum (based on the greater number of UDFA both picked up and rostered, that number may actually be closer to 350-400). And because of the above point regarding stats, there’s no easy way to even cut down from the universe of “all FBS and FCS players” to “300 prospects worth looking at”.

Tape scouting is considerably more difficult

In basketball scouting, the tape is used to provide context to numbers and to give a fuller picture of a player. You’re looking for very specific things – shooting form, court awareness, athletic profile, see if anything stands out good or bad either way. There’s only 10 players vs. 22 and you can see all the action on the screen at all times. Defensive systems are well-defined and easy to parse right away. Offensive systems are fairly simple systems of screens and cuts. Regardless of whether shots actually go in, players are fairly consistent from game to game, so watching a few minutes of a few games, when combined with the numbers, is really all you need.

In football scouting, the tape stands for itself – the numbers provide little useful guidance. Each position has very different things to look for to the point where it’s basically evaluating different sports – it takes hours upon hours upon hours to learn enough to be able to look at one position. It is difficult to find all-22 tape for college from any angle – it simply isn’t publicly available. Any outlet that does not have access to the all-22 tape (especially from behind the offense and behind the defense) cannot do any real scouting for any position other than QB and maybe RB and the lines. Each player’s responsibility can change on each play, and I generally find that to really understand a given play, you need to watch it at least 6 times, minimum, to see what actually happened (I have watched many plays 15+ times). It is tedious and time-consuming – charting a single pass play for a single player took me 2-3 minutes. Basically, to truly accurately evaluate a single player, I believe you need to spend no less than 5 hours doing intense film study. I don’t think any draftnik has spent that much time on more than a handful of prospects.

So yeah, scouting football prospects is significantly more difficult.

The NFL Has Changed

In developing my NBA projection systems over the past few years, the biggest changes have been in recognizing major, fundamental shifts in the way the game is played and adjusting the value of players to reflect their contributions towards winning basketball games. That is, recognizing that skills and talents that were useful in the past are less or not useful now. This has nothing to do with individual talent level and everything to do with determining what talents are relevant to winning championships. The goal of any sport is to win the championship. How that goal is achieved is not static. Why do so many fans treat it as such?

In the NBA, a change in defensive rules caused changes in defensive schemes, which in turn caused changes in offensive schemes, which in turn completely changed how the game was played. This all occurred very rapidly. While many fans still value(d) skills that had been valuable in the 90s, NBA basketball as played now has no real relation to NBA basketball played even 15 years ago.

The NFL is no different. There are multiple rule changes basically every year. The total sum of those changes is that passing is easier (because of changes to what DBs can do) and blocking is worse (because of changes to how OLs can practice). Over the past few seasons, rushing has stayed static or dropped slightly, while passing has ticked up significantly (it dropped a little this year, in part thanks to Kizer’s special brand of terrible and in part due to defenses that are finally seeming to adjust a little).

While fans and analysts alike fetishize runners and “road-graders”, the fact of the matter is that, much like the NBA’s low-post game, the NFL’s rushing game simply isn’t nearly as relevant as it was in the past, and to the extent it is, its impact is limited. It should be noted that while RB rushing isn’t particularly relevant to winning, QB rushing is, as QBs tend to carry for a much higher YPC and much higher rate of first downs.

Because the NFL has changed, positional value must change with it

For my 2017 NBA big board, I actually put a value on each role, because some skillsets are more rare and more valuable than others. NFL fans clearly understand this – ask them the highest they would draft a kicker or punter and they’ll say 4th or 5th or maybe not at all. They have value, but they have limited value over replacement, so they’re not worth spending high picks on. But then when it comes to other positions, this same logic doesn’t seem to apply.

Part of this is due to disagreement as to what each position’s value is. As a general rule of thumb though, players who are involved in the passing game on either side of the ball should be significantly upgraded and players who are geared to the rushing game should be significantly downgraded. This is most noticeable with RBs, who are never worth a top draft pick. These players are overrated because they are highly visible and fantasy-relevant, but they are replaceable, have a low hit rate, and most importantly, simply do not have a big impact in winning games. Run-stopping DTs and LBs, runblocking OLs, and the like should also be significantly downgraded. QBs, WRs, passblocking OLs, passrushers, and pass defenders should be upgraded.


I started this project fully intending to do a deep dive and create a big board for at least the top 50 or so NFL draft prospects. Due to all of the above, I simply do not have the time necessary to do a good job. Therefore, I have decided to simply scout the QB prospects. Enjoy!


The Big Board 2017

Going to keep the introduction as brief as possible here. I suggest you read all the articles leading up to this:

Reference Series: Age

Reference Series: Defense

Reference Series: The Eye Test

Making a big board is hard

Lessons from other leagues

Players are classified in the following positions:

-Primary: typical point guard role – 1 tier bump up

-Secondary: 3-and-D combo guards and wings who have the ability to handle and pass a bit and have the ability to develop into either a point guard or a strong complement to a point guard – half tier bump up

-Wing: typical 3-and-D run around screens and shoot players – 1 tier bump down

-Stretch: forwards who can shoot the 3 – no bump

-Rim: centers who can protect the rim – no bump

-???: players who don’t neatly fit into any of those other categories – mainly guards and forwards who can’t shoot and centers who can’t protect the rim – dropped 2 or more tiers

There’s also three minor modifications I make for players that I have not written about anywhere else:

-Odd bodies. This is short guys, fat guys, weirdly shaped guys, etc. These guys tend not to get a real chance to prove themselves (if they get any chance at all), and since opportunity is a big part of panning out, I have started dropping these guys a bit because even if they could be good, they typically just don’t get the chance, and I am taking that into account.

-Poor athletes. Every year, there’s a few guys who put up fantastic stats but scouts are much lower on them because of a lack of physical tools. These guys tend to overperform scout expectations, but they still tend to underperform stat expectations. I am adjusting accordingly.

-Conference player of the year. There has been some predictive value of these players going on to decent or better NBA careers. These players are marked with an * on the big board.

If you’re not familiar with my system, here’s my writeup from last year. Players are split into tiers. Tiers reflect a player’s total value – upside, chance of reaching upside, NBA role, etc. A player with a low ceiling but a high chance of reaching it may be in the same tier as a player with a much higher ceiling but a much lower chance of reaching any kind of potential. Players are not ranked within tiers. I did not rank any players who played less than 500 NCAA minutes last season, as my system does not project those players with any kind of accuracy. It does not mean they are good or bad prospects, it simply means that since I use a statistical system, I do not project any players who I do not have enough data for. No, I do not hate your favorite prospect or your school. Yes, these are real rankings and I am serious. Okay, let’s get to it!

Tier 1

Markelle Fultz, primary, 19.0 years old, 1.20 FPM

Lonzo Ball, primary, 19.6 years old, 1.10 FPM

These two lead guards are at the top of the class. Ball’s stats are absolutely out of this world – his shooting numbers (other than FTs) are elite, he led the NCAA in assists, he rebounded well above his position, and his advanced metrics were incredible. However, Ball is exactly the type of player warned about above – he is not an elite athlete, and while I would expect him to be a great player at the next level, he may never reach “best player on a championship team” level. Fultz was an elite player, but there are questions about his defense and ability to run an offense at the next level. He has higher upside than Ball, but is a little less safe. Overall, you can’t go wrong with either guy.

Tier 2

Dennis Smith, Jr., primary, 19.6, 1.02 FPM

DSJ finds himself alone here, not quite in the same class as Fultz and Ball, but better than the group below. Smith has all the tools to be elite, but needs to develop his game mentally. He may also have some physical upside, as he was only a year removed from ACL surgery, an injury that usually requires two years to fully recover from.

Tier 3

De’Aaron Fox, primary, 19.5, 1.02 FPM

Jawun Evans, primary, 20.9, 1.21 FPM

Josh Jackson, secondary, 20.3, 1.05 FPM

Jayson Tatum, stretch, 19.3, 0.92 FPM

Jonathan Isaac, stretch, 19.7, 1.04 FPM

Sindarius Thornwell*, secondary, 22.8, 1.12 FPM

This group is talented but flawed. Everybody has the ability to be an elite player, but they all have glaring weaknesses. Fox is has elite physical tools but showed no 3 point shooting ability, which is basically a must in today’s NBA. Jawun Evans was extremely productive, but is undersized and underathletic. Josh Jackson has an ugly looking shot and couldn’t make his FTs, leading to major shooting questions. Jayson Tatum is young and was good at everything but not great at anything – I have him as a stretch here, but he could be a secondary depending on who drafts him and how he develops physically. Jonathan Isaac is a D-and-3 player at this point – he looks to be a defense-first player who should be able to provide just enough on offense to make him a valuable player. Sindarius Thornwell fits the physical profile of secondaries who typically overperform – he is a big strong body. He shot the 3 over 39%, led all major conference players in free throw attempts, rebounded, played D, and helped facilitate at times. He led the nation in box plus-minus. The question is only if he was good because he was bigger and older than everybody or because he’s just that good.

Tier 4

Donovan Mitchell, secondary, 20.8, 0.94 FPM

Malik Monk*, wing, 19.4, 0.85 FPM

Caleb Swanigan*, stretch, 20.2, 1.04 FPM

TJ Leaf, stretch, 20.1, 1.05 FPM

John Collins, rim, 19.7, 1.24 FPM

Zach Collins, rim, 19.7, 1.18 FPM

This group is a step below the previous group in both top level potential and likelihood of being a major impact player. Mitchell appears to have all the tools to be an ideal secondary, but he’s likely going to need a few years to develop and may not have the ability to be a true second option. Monk has shown more creation abilities than most 3-point snipers, but he’s still not really a secondary. Any team drafting him would be wise to really work with him on his handling and vision to try to get him there. Swanigan and Leaf are a pair of highly productive stretch 4s with athletic and defensive question marks. It’s hard to see either of them being bad, but most likely, they settle in as roleplayers that make fans of at least 5 opposing teams hate them. John and Zach Collins were both highly productive players, but John will need to bulk up to play C at the next level or develop a 3P shot to play PF at the next level and Zach did a lot of interesting things, but did them in limited minutes as a mid-major backup. He could be a 3-and-rim guy, which is extremely valuable, but he will have to prove he can do it against a much higher level of competition – his foul rate was through the roof even against the lower level.

Tier 5

Derrick White, primary, 23, 1.04 FPM

Monte Morris, primary, 22, 1.04 FPM

Nigel Williams-Goss*, primary, 22.8, 1.02 FPM

Frank Mason III*, primary, 23.2, 0.96 FPM

Dillon Brooks*, secondary, 21.4, 1.00 FPM

Josh Hart*, secondary, 22.3, 0.98 FPM

Jordan Bell, rim, 22.4, 1.04 FPM

The veterans. Morris, Williams-Goss, and Mason are classic pass-first PGs who could help run the offense for bench units. White is a 3rd guard who should be able to swing between the guard positions and fill in wherever necessary. Brooks and Hart are your classic 3-and-D guys, with the ability to create a bit for themselves and others pushing them a little ahead of some others. Jordan Bell is a bit undersized but was 3rd in the NCAA in box plus minus – his ability to both protect the rim and switch on the perimeter is something teams are looking for.

I’m going to take a brief interlude to talk about Derrick White. Read this article on him. He’s the bingo card of evaluation errors. Undervalued coming out of high school because he was very young for his year. Ignored skills due to physical attributes. Didn’t have the hype of playing on a high quality AAU team. Now he’s undervalued because he’s too old. He’s proof that guys develop at different rates, physically, mentally, skills-wise. Everybody should internalize the story of Derrick White.

Tier 6A

Justin Jackson*, secondary, 22.2, 0.88 FPM

Peter Jok, secondary, 23.2, 0.95 FPM

Jeremy Morgan, secondary, 22.1, 0.88 FPM

Luke Kennard, wing, 21, 0.84 FPM

Just splitting Tier 6 into secondary and bigs. Justin Jackson finds his way in here as he wasn’t particularly impressive, but he has shown to be a late bloomer and was ACC Player of the Year, so maybe there’s more there. Peter Jok needs to up his D and cut his turnovers, but he’s a good shooter and passer. Jeremy Morgan really faded as the year went on, but has all the skills needed if he can translate them to the next level. Luke Kennard just wasn’t productive enough, doesn’t project to be able to defend at the next level, and by the stats, he’s not good enough at creating for others to be considered a secondary, although he has shown enough ability to maybe develop into it in a year or two.

Tier 6B

Rashawn Thomas, stretch, 22.8, 1.19 FPM

Jacob Wiley*, stretch, 22.8, 1.09 FPM

Cameron Oliver, stretch, 20.9, 1.06 FPM

Tyler Lydon, stretch, 21.2, 0.83 FPM

Thomas Bryant, stretch/rim, 19.9, 0.87 FPM

Tim Kempton, stretch/rim, 22.6, 1.06 FPM

Moses Kingsley, rim, 22.6, 1.02 FPM

Tony Bradley, rim, 19.4, 1.00 FPM

Justin Patton, rim, 20.0, 0.99 FPM

Kennedy Meeks, ???, 22.4, 1.15 FPM

Lauri Markkanen, ???, 20.1, 0.81 FPM

Rashawn Thomas led the NCAA in FTA, had 50+ steals and 50+ blocks, and added a 3 point shot late in the year that looks pretty good. Jake Wiley was Big Sky Player of the Year. Despite standing 6’7, he has a 7′ wingspan and an incredible 37.5″ no step vert. He has shown signs of being able to shoot the 3 with a little more time and development. Cam Oliver shot over 38% on 172 3PA and added 91 blocks. Tyler Lydon was a low usage player, but was a quality shooter who chipped in everywhere and may be able to carve out the same role at the next level. Thomas Bryant is a true C who has shown both stretch and rim abilities, but whoever drafts him should be prepared to let him develop in the D-League for two years. Tim Kempton is a second generation player who has also shown both stretch and rim abilities, but he just may not have NBA level athleticism. Moses Kingsley is an undersized rim protector with limited other abilities but who has only been playing professional basketball for 6 years and may have some growth left. Tony Bradley is basically an unknown, but whoever drafts him probably will not see any return on investment for at least a few years. Justin Patton has good athletic tools but needs time to develop everything else. Kennedy Meeks is really good but doesn’t really fit anywhere in the NBA. He may still be fine as a 3rd big.

So, Lauri Markkanen. Lauri Markkanen can shoot the ball, and shoot it well. He was also surprisingly adept at getting to the line. If he could do, well, anything else, he’d be a few tiers higher. But he’s bad at using his offense to create for others. He rebounds like a PF despite being 7′ tall. He absolutely cannot defend – he is second to last in steals+blocks per minute among players on this board, ahead of only Ojeleye, and his defensive advanced metrics match. So he can’t play C, and at 7′ tall, he’s the wrong size to play PF and doesn’t have nearly the athletic ability to hang with smaller 4s or punish them. I know shooting is important, but so is passing, defense, and rebounding.

Tier 7

Mo Evans, primary, 22.6, 0.98 FPM

Dallas Moore*, primary, 22.6, 0.97 FPM

Quinton Hooker, primary, 22.3, 0.93 FPM

Derrick Walton, Jr., primary, 22.2, 0.87 FPM

Michael Young, secondary, 22.8, 0.95 FPM

Malcolm Hill, secondary, 21.6, 0.88 FPM

Gian Clavell*, wing, 23.6, 0.94 FPM

Semi Ojeleye, wing, 22.5, 0.84 FPM

Alec Peters*, stretch, 22.2, 1.03 FPM

Josh Hawkinson, stretch, 22.0, 0.89 FPM

We’re into the real bottom of the barrel guys here. Mo Evans, Dallas Moore, and Quinton Hooker are low major PGs who can really, really shoot. Walton played can also really shoot but is too lacking in too many areas. Michael Young and Malcolm Hill are the types of guys who make for great college players but just aren’t NBA quality and end up as support players in Europe or the D-League. Gian Clavell might be the most interesting prospect in this bunch. His highlights make him look better than he is, but man, you can dream on these, can’t you? Semi Ojeleye is athletic and can score but hasn’t shown much other ability. Alec Peters and Josh Hawkinson are potential stretch 4s who probably lack the athleticism necessary for the next level.

The rest

Bam Adebayo, rim, 19.9, 0.86 FPM

Jarrett Allen, rim, 19.2, 0.77 FPM

Deonte Burton, ???, 23.4, 1.00 FPM

Jack Gibbs, primary, 22.4, 0.91 FPM

Devin Robinson, stretch, 22.3, 0.81 FPM

Adebayo was a below average rim protector who doesn’t bring anything special anywhere and has limited tools. Allen was very young and was playing out of position, so there might be something more there, but right now, he’s basically a toolsy big with no real skills. Deonte Burton is 6’4, 266. He is a skilled player, but he has to do a ton of body work before he’s an NBA player. Gibbs and Robinson are both right on the edge of what I consider a prospect but are included here.

The lessons learned from other leagues

Making a big board is hard. I have started looking outside the NBA Draft sphere for wisdom in other sports. After all, a draft is a draft, a team sport is a team sport, put it all together, and there’s some useful nuggets to be found.


Not all positions are valued equally in the NFL draft. QBs are valued significantly higher due to their extreme importance to the offense and to the team. Pass-rushing defensive ends have been valued higher due to their extreme importance to the defense. RBs are valued significantly lower due to their reliance on the offensive line and their low hit rate out of the draft and are typically drafted for team fit. And so on and so forth.

What does this have to do with the NBA draft? Not all positions have equal value, and I believe a big board should reflect this.

Last year, I wrote an overly complicated position manifesto. It…is just too complicated. This year, I have separated prospects into 6 categories: Primary, Secondary, Wing, Stretch, Rim, and ???. Primary is your typical point guard role. Secondary is 3-and-D combo guards and wings who have the ability to handle and pass a bit and have the ability to develop into either a point guard or a strong complement to a point guard. Wing is your typical 3-and-D run around screens and shoot players. Stretch is forwards who can shoot the 3. Rim is centers who can protect the rim. ??? is players who don’t neatly fit into any of those other categories – mainly guards and forwards who can’t shoot and centers who can’t protect the rim. Primary players get bumped up a tier, as they are the most valuable (the QBs, so to speak). Secondary players get bumped up half a tier – if they are close to the tier above, they will be pushed into it. Stretch and Rim players are roughly equal and do not get a tier adjustment. Wing players are the proverbial RBs – they have low upside, a low hit rate, and are filling out a roster. They are dropped a tier. ??? players are dropped 2 or more tiers, as no matter how good they are, if they don’t fit, their impact is severely dampened.

Without these adjustments, two players of equal talent but unequal value get ranked equally. But if they have different value, why should they be ranked equally? The NFL has shown that failing to adjust for value and simply taking the best talent does not lead to good results. The NBA has really shown the same. Adjustments should be made.


The MLB draft is very different than the NBA and NFL drafts. Why? Because MLB teams understand that kids need to mature into adults before they’re ready for the big leagues, and that most prospects simply are never going to be good enough to play at the top level.

MLB prospects can be drafted in roughly the same age range as NBA prospects. Almost every MLB prospect spends at least some time in the minor leagues. In fact, only one player has gone straight from the draft to the Majors in the past 20 years. Not just players drafted out of high school. Of all players drafted, only one player has gone straight to the majors in 20 years. Why? Because even the best, most ready prospects benefit from an adjustment period to get used to a higher level of competition, a harder schedule, and all of the other challenges that come with becoming a pro. Even Mike Trout, who is on his way to becoming one of the top players of all time, spent over two years in the minors.

Of course, Mike Trout was drafted 25th overall. He was ranked the #85 prospect in baseball the offseason after he was drafted. At no time was he ranked the #1 prospect in baseball. In fact, until he reached the majors, he didn’t show nearly all the skills he showed after he got there and continued growing.

This is a typical story. Baseball fans are conditioned for this. Players drafted high bust. Players drafted low hit. Players develop skills as they get older. Of the top 5 domestic hitters in WAR this season, two attended college after being late draft picks out of high school. They were drafted out of college in the late 1st round and the 8th round. Of the top 5 domestic pitchers in WAR this season, two were drafted in the mid-rounds out of high school and then were drafted in the early-mid-first out of college, one was drafted in the 5th round out of high school, one was drafted 7th overall out of high school, and one was drafted 1st overall out of college after not even getting drafted at all out of high school.

What does this have to do with basketball? One of the challenges of prospect evaluation is that some players just never get an opportunity. But it goes further than that. In basketball, players who are older are treated as “no longer good prospects” and are significantly downgraded for nothing more than developing later. It would be nice if every player and prospect developed at exactly the same rate, but that’s just not the way it works. Guys develop in jumps and bumps, not a smooth curve. Some jump a lot. Some jump a little. Some jump a year before others. Baseball teams understand this and evaluates every prospect on their own merits. Basketball teams tend to overvalue young players and undervalue older players. They also do not have a proper minor league system, and thus players who may not deserve it but were drafted highly get many opportunities, while players who may deserve a look but were not drafted just hope they get a chance. It’s just a really inefficient system at every level right now.

Prospects are also never a guarantee. Ever. Baseball fans are conditioned for this. Most don’t pay attention to the draft or to prospects until they become elite prospects in higher levels. It is expected that most prospects, even top prospects, will bust or fall well short of elite. Basketball teams and fans would do well to adopt this mindset, accepting that prospects need time to develop and that some will surprise and some will disappoint, and that the more who are given chances, the better it will be for everybody.

Why making a good big board is hard

It’s a fact of the draft projection business: people will look back at every big board you’ve ever done and point out every mistake you’ve ever made. They will question every projection out of line with the consensus. They will point out how much you’ve failed. Back in 2015, I wrote about the challenges in prospect projection. That was after doing it officially for just one year. Two years later, I’ve learned a whole lot more, and it’s time to revisit just why this is so damn hard.

1. Judging players is ultimately subjective.

I tend to fall back on BPM and WS/48, but those stats are highly imperfect. Last year I started messing around with some numbers to try to figure out what kind of positional adjustment needed to be applied to them – it’s pretty significant. Coaching and teammates influence them. Role highly influences them. They also value certain skills more than others. Traditional stats and traditional opinion have value. How much value? Depends who you ask. I don’t particularly value them, but some people point to 20 PPG and say “how can you say the player is bad?”

Looking at any big board, it’s important to keep in mind that you may evaluate or value players differently than the person who created the board. It doesn’t make one of you more right than the other, but it helps to keep an open mind as to all ways players can be evaluated when judging projection success.

2. It takes a minimum of five years to competently assess a draft class.

Players improve in fits and starts up until they are 23-24 years old. Many players are drafted as 19 year olds. See the problem?

If only people were so patient.

The first draft class I officially ranked was 2014. Only a single player drafted in the top 10 of that class has played their age 23 season (Stauskas). We still have no idea how that class is going to turn out. So far, it’s been pretty abysmal, with Nikola Jokic the only player who has made any kind of real impact. That will change in the next 2-3 years. But most of the guys taken high have just finished their age 21 season. They still have a lot of growth left. I think we’re just now getting to the point where we can look at the 2012 draft class with a strong idea of the talent of every player.

I know it’s hard to be five years patient, but judging any earlier should really just result in an “incomplete”.

3a. Because it takes five years to assess a draft class, it takes a long time to learn lessons.

3b. Because it takes five years to assess a draft class, sometimes the NBA changes and what was projected is no longer relevant.

These two points go together. This is my 4th draft doing this. That means that anything I did wrong in previous drafts…I still wouldn’t really know for certain!

I consume as much draft and basketball content as I can, because we all learn from each other. It really is the only way to learn. Of my 2014 top 12, 5 have suffered major or career-ending injuries and a 6th did not come over immediately. The already limited data is more limited. I try to identify mistakes I make, but it’s just so hard to tell. And you only get one chance to practice each year.

The confounding factor is that the NBA is changing at such a rapid rate that what was projected in 2014 is of only questionable value. What was projected then may look bad, but it may have made perfect sense at the time. For example, players like Elfrid Payton and Aaron Gordon were highly ranked by both scouts and stats. Having them in the lottery was completely defensible. Now? Elfrid Payton would probably project as a late first at best, and I would be projecting Aaron Gordon as a center. The 2014 projections weren’t wrong. The NBA just completely changed in the 3 years since they’ve been drafted. Does that mean the big board was bad?

I have made major changes to my formula and projections every year to try to account for the changing landscape, but I cannot predict the future. Neither can any other draftnik. And by the time we realize what we’ve done wrong, it’s already changed.

4. The single most important skill can’t be scouted in college and is one of the last skills to develop.

NBA players need to shoot the NBA 3.

NCAA players shoot from shorter than the NBA 3.


Basically, if a player (other than a shot-blocking C) cannot shoot the 3, their NBA value tanks. But they don’t shoot the shot in college, and they typically don’t develop it, if at all, until they’re between 21 and 25. Yes, that’s a broad range. Yes, that goes even for the best college 3 point shooters. If a guy unexpectedly develops a shot, most people will end up having him ranked lower than he should have been. If a guy expected to shoot well fails to do so, most people will end up having him ranked higher than he should have been. And this development can be greatly affected by the team a player is drafted by and the coaching received.

This is the defining factor of whether 80% of NBA players succeed or fail at the next level, and there is simply no great way to project it. My big board presentation this year is taking this into account significantly more than usual, but if you look at a board and it seems off, this is probably why.

5. Variance.

Sometimes, unpredictable shit happens. Players get drafted to organizations who don’t teach them properly or don’t give them playing time. Others get drafted who use them in a way most others wouldn’t. Players mature as they turn from college age to adult age. Seriously, think about you at 19 vs. you at 22. Huge difference, right? Now you at 22 vs. you at 25. Huge difference again. Those of you who are younger – you won’t realize how much you’re changing until you’ve already changed. But it’s not predictable how these guys will change. Some guys have incredible work ethics. Some guys don’t really like playing. Some end up finding partying more interesting than practicing.

Basically, remember that in the end, this is still guesswork. Educated guesswork. Informed guesswork. But still guesswork.


A consensus tends to build every year as to where guys should be ranked. Ranking guys significantly differently than the consensus can draw questions or ridicule, especially when the rankings end up looking particularly wrong a year or two in. But it doesn’t mean the rankings were wrong. The NBA changes quickly. Players hit or bust for unforeseen reasons. Don’t focus on the players who were highly ranked who busted, or at least if you do, also focus on the players who were highly ranked and hit and the players who were lowly ranked and didn’t. Take all big boards and projections as best guesses – interesting to look at, interesting to read, but not something to be treated as 100% accurate. Not even close. Shooting 36% from 3 makes you a good NBA 3 point shooter. Shooting 36% on rankings would make you a good NBA prospect projector. It’s just that hard.

Reference Series: The Eye Test

You should stop looking at numbers and actually watch the games. You have no idea what you’re talking about.


If nobody ever said this again, the world would be a better place. There is not a single numbers guy out there, myself included, who does not factor in watching games to some extent. Just because somebody disagrees with your opinion of a player doesn’t mean they don’t watch, and just because they haven’t watched as many games as you doesn’t mean their opinion is less valid. The eye test is a good one, but to get the right answers, you have to ask the right questions.

So, while I’ve spent many many words on this site, LibertyBallers, reddit, and elsewhere talking about my statistical system, I’ve never actually explained how I personally use the eye test. After all, it makes up a not insignificant portion of player evaluation. I still start with the numbers, but the tape explains the numbers, and if they don’t, then there can be arguments, but it does not make one side more correct than the other – as with many things in life, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

First, and most importantly, I start with a simple but critical premise: what makes a player good is not what he can do, but how consistently he can do it.

There are literally hundreds of players coming out of college every year who can make amazing plays. The guys in the D-League are capable of amazing things. But being capable of making amazing plays does not make you an amazing player. There are a ton of guys who are stupid athletic and capable of doing insane things and also not good NBA prospects because they simply lack the skills and/or consistency necessary to become NBA players.

In fact, I even have a name for guys who make incredible highlights but lack consistency: Vine All-Stars. I guess the name is outdated now with Vine disappearing, but the point stands. These are guys who look great if you only ever look at highlights, because the good plays they make are awesome. But there are approximately 195 possessions in a basketball game. If you make amazing plays on 5 of them every game, that still leaves 190 possessions that matter just as much. It is these more typical, standard possessions that define how good a player is.

Everybody knows small sample size applies to stats, but it applies equally to the eye test. A highlight tape or a highlight play simply is not useful in evaluating a player. The amount of times I’ve heard “does a bad player make that play?” or “do you still think he’s bad” after a player makes one good play is greater than 0. It should be 0. An NBA player, even the worst NBA player, should be capable of things that make us go wow. But that is no way to judge a player.

The average college player plays between 1,500 and 2,500 possessions in a season. Some of those possessions were awesome. Some of those possessions were awful. For scouting purposes? They’re worth noting but not worth focusing on. What’s much more interesting is all of those in the middle, because most possessions are not highlight OR lowlight worthy, but have a much bigger impact on the game by volume. That’s what I focus on, because it’s those rote, common plays that really point to a player’s skill level.

When scouting, most people focus on the player with the ball and the player defending the ball. That’s where the action is. And what happens there definitely matters. But most of the action takes place away from the ball, and for everybody other than PGs, that action is much more relevant to projection than what they do with it. On the ball is easy to look for – how well can a player dribble, hit pull-ups, pass, etc., and on defense, how well can a player navigate screens, stay in front of his man, use his hands, etc. But off the ball is where most players make their living.

So, on offense, I look for quality and timing of picks and cuts, positioning, and finding open spots and getting ready to receive passes. These are the things that make an offense work, and players who understand these nuances of the game and these secondary skills help an offense and show that they have an understanding of what they will need to do at the next level.

On defense, I look for ability to track off-ball movement, help and recover (for wings), help in the lane (for bigs), ball-man positioning, and navigation of pin-downs, flares, and other off-ball screens. It is a little harder to translate this to the NBA, as many NCAA teams run schemes that are not legal in the NBA, and many NCAA offenses don’t ask the same questions of the defense that NBA offenses do.

I also watch rebounding, a facet of the game that is too often ignored given its importance and that there is a rebound on more than 50 percent of all possessions. Rebounding is much more than size + length + jump. Boxing out is a skill. Reading a shot in the air and positioning for the bounce is a skill. Sneaking in to crash is a skill. These are all important to being a good NBA player, yet they are too often ignored.

I try to watch 2-4 games of as many prospects as I can. While I would like to watch more, I don’t have the time (and neither does anybody else not getting paid to do it!) Why 2-4 games? Because that is generally a large enough sample to see athleticism, potential top level ability, and everything mentioned above. I use this limited eye test to supplement the stats to try to get the strongest projection of a player I can. While watching more games of a player may give a more accurate picture of that player’s capabilities, if you’re not looking for the right things, watching every game still won’t make a difference. There’s also a tendency to judge players who you watch a lot differently than players you only watch a few times. This tends to manifest a bias for or against the players you watch simply because there is a stronger opinion about them than other players. Watching everybody roughly the same amount can eliminate some of this bias.

There’s a lot more to basketball than just your good/flashy plays. When watching games, look at all facets of a player’s game – to do otherwise can only lead to an incomplete picture.

Reference Series: Age

Back in January, I did a piece with Don Yates about the one-and-done rule. Buried in that piece, I wrote a section on age and development. I have referenced it so often since then that I am separating it out into its own piece here and expanding on it.

NBA draft prospects are typically discussed and separated by their college year. This is, quite frankly, a terrible system. Players in a given college year can be born more than a full year apart. This season, Markelle Fultz was born in May 1998 and Josh Jackson was born February 1997. Both are freshman. John Collins was born in September 1997 and Luke Kennard was born June 1996. Both are sophomores. Yet John Collins, the sophomore, is younger than Josh Jackson, the freshman. So why even bother talking about their college year?

I wanted to see if maybe there was some correlation between college year and future performance. I looked at it in two ways. First, I looked at the age and year top players (I used BPM and WS/48 to make this list, you may use a different method, but I think this is representative) entered the league. This was my “star search” – were superstars more predictable by age of first NBA season or draft year. Here were my results:

LeBron HSS 19
Durant Fr 19
Giannis Intl 19
Davis Fr 19
Westbrook So 20
Harden So 20
Paul So 20
Jokic Intl 20
Kawhi So 20
Lowry So 20
Cousins Fr 20
Conley Fr 20
Towns Fr 20
Hayward So 20
Jordan Fr 20
Wall Fr 20
Curry Jr 21
Gobert Intl 21
Griffin So 21
Butler Jr 22
Thomas Jr 22
Green Sr 22
Lillard Sr 22
M. Gasol Intl 24

4 19 year olds, 12 20 year olds, 3 21 year olds, 4 22 year olds, 1 24 year old. 1 high school senior, 7 freshmen, 7 sophomore, 3 junior, 2 senior, 4 international. Both year and age indicate that top players enter the league sooner rather than later, which is to be expected as most top players are identified early and come out early. There are many more players who play their first season at age 20 than age 19, so that could explain the difference, but looking at the four players on this list who entered at age 19, there is a common thread that points to something very interesting.

What do LeBron, Durant, Giannis, and Davis have in common? They are physical freaks of nature, guys who would have been top prospects by dint of physical attributes alone. Three of them were also considered generational prospects. Now, there’s too many variables to try to isolate any given variable, but I have often argued that prospects who enter the league young are judged before they have fully developed and are not given the opportunity they should be given. These four guys were going to be given every opportunity to succeed, and succeed they have.

A few years ago, a study was released regarding how hockey players born earlier in the year were given preferential treatment in youth hockey and in the draft even though there was no evidence that players born earlier in the year actually went on to be better players in the NHL. You can read about it here, here, and here (and elsewhere). Basically, youth hockey has a Dec. 31/Jan. 1 cutoff and when you’re 9, 10, 11 years old, the difference between being born in January and being born late in the year is massive. Players born earlier in the year are better simply by virtue of being older, and they are given more chances, better instruction, play against better competition, etc., while younger players are forgotten or left behind.

Looking at the above table, I wonder how many players drafted very young never developed into full-blown superstars because they were simply too young and were not given full opportunities to develop or shine. Maybe they weren’t ready emotionally or mentally. Maybe it’s just random noise, given that the NBA was dominated by guys like Kobe and Garnett for awhile, but at the same time, it was understood that straight from High School guys would take longer to develop than college players. It’s at least something to keep in mind when evaluating both draft prospects and young NBA players.

The second test I ran was looking at a wide range of players to see if there was any kind of pattern in terms of NBA growth. This included looking at stars, scrubs, players who entered young, players who entered old. I looked at about 50 players to try to get a good cross-section. Sometime during the upcoming season, I’m going to try to do a more detailed analysis, but it’s going to take time I don’t have right now to aggregate data, develop formulas, implement formulas, etc. So eying the data will have to suffice for now. Here is what I found:

  1. The age in which a player entered the league had no effect on growth curve. I can’t even confirm there was a higher rate of injury. It really looks like, as far as overall growth is concerned, it doesn’t matter what age you play your first NBA game.
  2. Pretty much without exception, players were bad before age 20 (there were a few age 19 backup quality seasons), took a leap at age 20 or 21, took another leap at age 22 or 23, and then basically all players showed either consistent growth through the late 20s or took another leap some time between 24 and 28.
  3. Age growth curves held steady among stars, midlevel guys, low level guys, HS guys, one-and-dones, multiple college years, and foreign guys.
  4. Age growth curves held steady across positions.
  5. Players occasionally had an “adjustment year” (year below what would be expected based on their age and the rest of their career) their first year, but it was not common and did not appear to follow any pattern.
  6. If you like using BPM, players with a BPM of -2.0 or better as a 19 year old typically go on to be stars, players between -2.1 and -4.0 have mixed outcomes ranging from 4th or 5th starter to washout (and there does not appear to be a pattern in that range – a -2.5 and a -3.5 appear to have the same probability of outcomes), and players below -4.0 are basically backups at best for their career (in part possibly because guys who play that poorly often stop receiving opportunities).

Now, I’m not going to say this is a perfect fit for every player, but as a prognosticator, I’m looking for high probability patterns, not 100% perfect fits, because they don’t exist. There will always be exceptions. But I’m comfortable using this as a projection fit for now.

In general, teams and fans are too quick to judge a player’s future value based on age 19-22 seasons without proper context and that do not represent a player’s peak talents. There is a bad tendency to look at what a guy does early in his career and use that as a baseline of his true talent level, when true talent level really is not established until age 23 or even later. So you have guys who end up with bad reputations (D’Angelo Russell and Tyus Jones come to mind as recent examples) despite doing absolutely nothing wrong and end up regarded far less than they should be because they just entered the league too early, and with guys who are not drafted particularly highly, often their careers end up on the wrong path for no reason other than being too young when they entered the league.

And it hurts everybody. Older (21-23 year old) players coming out of college are often not evaluated properly and are downgraded just because they weren’t highly touted and had a spikier growth curve. Younger (18-20 year old) players coming out of college with a lot of hype but before they’re really ready get tossed to the side before they’re fully formed and do not end up developing the skills they should have been, leading to a higher fail rate. The only players teams are really identifying well right now are true can’t miss guys.

Teams are discarding young guys for not being ready at an age nobody’s ready at, and teams are significantly underdrafting, underplaying, and giving far too few looks at older guys who had big talent spikes a little bit later than guys who had flatter growth. Teams are missing talent on both ends of the age curve due to misguided ideas (or, just as likely, a lack of thought altogether) about what players can and should look like and what improvement curves look like.

When you’re looking at prospects in this draft and around the league, put them in context. It can only help.

Reference Series: Defense

Some of you (especially the young’uns) may not know about the illegal defense rule changes and why iso players, whether in the post or from the wing, are not nearly as efficient or useful as they used to be. Despite the rules being changed prior to the 2001-2002 season and modern defenses starting to appear around 2008, basketball conversation still flows as if it were the 90s. It’s not the 90s anymore. The conversation needs to change.

A brief history lesson – prior to 2001, the NBA’s “illegal defense” rules basically mandated that you had to guard a man. The illegal defense rules were removed for the 01-02 season and replaced with the modern D3S rule. What did this mean? Prior to 01-02, you could not double off the ball. You had to be somewhat close to your man at all times. All help defense had to come late and could not remain indefinitely. Basically, if you wanted to go 1 on 1, all you needed was for everybody to clear out and you had a true 1 on 1. You couldn’t guard space. You could double team in theory, but you basically could only double team from the nearest man and only if he was near you and he had the ball. It meant that basketball was entirely a 1-on-1 game.

This article from when the vote on whether to remove the illegal defense rules was taking place is absolutely incredible, and I’m going to liberally quote from it here:

The changes are meant to encourage more movement and passing, while discouraging teams from steering offenses toward isolation plays, in which a majority of a team’s players stand idle on the weakside to draw defenders away from the ball. That trend has been a factor in the decrease in scoring over the past decade.

”I think it’s a huge mistake,” Miami Coach Pat Riley said last week. ”There’s not going to be anybody able to drive. With these rules, you’re going to be back in the 70’s in scoring. You can’t force pace.”

”It sounds very bold, and it is,” acknowledged Jerry Colangelo, the Phoenix Suns owner and chairman of the committee that submitted the recommendation two weeks ago. ”But at this point, it’s better than a tweak. The fact is, we don’t have any fluidity in our game right now. There is less ball movement and less player movement than there’s ever been.”

Most opponents of the rule changes agree with Colangelo that the game has become too stagnant and that the choreography of teamwork has all but disappeared from many arenas. But they don’t feel such a dramatic change will suddenly turn the game into the free-flowing style that will raise television ratings and increase fan interest.

”It would change the sport,” said Tomjanovich, one of the most vocal opponents of the zone defense. ”We should create a situation where great players get a chance to excel. Zones neutralize great athletic ability. People want to see guys who can soar to the basket.”

Calling the committee’s proposed changes a ”knee-jerk reaction to complaints about the pace of the game,” Riley added: ”Fans like to see Vince Carter play one on one outside. That stuff is going to be history. Isolation basketball has been part of the game ever since I’ve been in it.”

Other coaches like George Karl and Phil Jackson — weary of the increased focus on defense and the plodding halfcourt sets that have led to the game’s stagnation — are fine with the changes.

”I’m totally O.K. with the zone,” Jackson said. ”It’s going to hurt Shaq, but it’s still part of what the game has to be.”

”It will mess the game up,” Portland point guard Damon Stoudamire said. ”I’m not a big advocate of zone defense. That’s the reason why players leave college. You’re going to put a box-and-one on Vince Carter? Fans are paying money to see these games. You can’t just take away what has essentially made the N.B.A. what it is: one-on-one basketball.”

That is one of the major concerns among opponents: that coaches will have more control of the game.

”People will be coming up with all kinds of crazy defenses,” Tomjanovich said. ”I want what’s best for the N.B.A. I’m not sure these rule changes are.”

The committee watched old footage of N.B.A. games spliced in with new footage. One of the offensive sets was that of the Rockets, in which a player like Steve Francis was isolated on one side of the floor against his defender, while four other players emptied out on the other side of the floor.

”A typical Houston set is giving one guy the ball and sending everyone else away from him,” Colangelo said. ”Hardly anyone else is even involved. It’s not the lack of ball movement. People wonder whatever happened to the lost art of offensive rebounding. Players are no longer in position to rebound because of some of these sets.”

Charlotte forward Jamal Mashburn said: ”I don’t see how that’s going to promote scoring. You look at teams like the Lakers and the Heat. Shaq and Alonzo will be in the lane. Imagine playing against David Robinson and Tim Duncan, standing there in the middle in a 3-2 zone.”

This article is an absolutely incredible look at what the NBA was like and was an amazing predictor of the following decade and even explains exactly why the NBA has evolved the way it has. Basically, in the 90s, teams figured out that the best way to exploit the rules was to give the ball to their best player and get the other 4 guys as far away as possible. This meant that the stars got to be stars. Can you imagine trying to defend today’s top players without double teams? Can you imagine trying to defend Harden or Curry with no help defense at all? What kind of offensive numbers do you think they would put up?

“Jordan spoke passionately. If teams were able to play zone defenses, he said, he never would have had the career he did.”

Reading through those above quotes though, everybody is right. People like seeing iso plays. They are aesthetically pleasing when they work. The highlight the stars. The changes did hurt iso players like Shaq and Vince Carter (Allen Iverson is a prime example of somebody who was amazing before the rule changes and not nearly as good after them). There was no instant change, and in fact, at first, the worst fears of the people against the change came true.

You can actually see defensive rule changes by just following eFG. There were a bunch of rule changes for the 97-98 season, and you can see eFG tank from the previous year. It stays low through 03-04 – these rule changes didn’t actually work particularly well at first! A big part of it was that it would take a generation for players who grew up under the new rules to start coming into the league with the proper skillset.

Still trying to boost offense, prior to the 04-05 season, “New rules were introduced to curtail hand-checking, clarify blocking fouls and call defensive three seconds to open up the game.” And the game finally opened up – 04-05 saw the birth of Mike D’Antoni’s “Seven Seconds or Less” Suns, and eFG started going back up. It hit .497 in 07-08, and it has remained between .496 and .502 since (with the exception of the lockout year). This is basically defenses and offense trading adjustments. You can see it when you watch – defenders cheat and move all over the court now, seemingly always doubling wherever the ball is, and ball movement is extra important to unlock these defenses.

The most efficient modern offense is fairly easy to explain. It’s a pick and roll, followed by the ball handler getting into the paint and either going to the rim or passing, and then kicking the ball around trying to find a 3 or a layup/dunk. There’s usually multiple picks set on every play trying to free people. This means that, 15+ years after those rule changes that people were afraid were going to remove dynamism from the game, those players are back in vogue, as long as they have the right skillset and have shooters around them. Shooters, which, prior to around 2013, simply didn’t exist in high enough volume.

The defense is a little harder to explain. The short version is that the defense floods the side of the court where the ball is with an extra defender who is only guarding space/playing help D/providing doubles. This wasn’t legal until the illegal defense rule changes and wasn’t utilized until Thibodeau created it in roughly 07-08, and the Celtics that won the title that year. Pretty much all modern defenses are versions of Thibs’ defense, just like most modern offenses are versions of D’Antoni’s offense (include the purest version of it currently run by, uh, Mike D’Antoni).

The best way to show the difference in defense then vs. now is to just go to the tape.

Against post players, under modern defenses, help comes either from the weakside or from the weakest shooter. Here’s a pretty good breakdown. These are hard doubles. Here’s another example. Basically, you force the big to either make a tough cross-court pass which is far enough that the defense can rotate and recover, or you force him to pass back out to a covered strong-side teammate to reset the offense. There’s also soft doubles, where a weakside defender will “show” but not fully commit, which is just a different kind of double where the post player has an extra split second to operate but it’s easier to recover if he passes out.

Now, take a look at a few minutes of this, which is how defense used to be played. You’ll notice that if he gets doubled, it’s always from the closest strongside defender, and it’s usually late. You’ll also notice how often he goes baseline. This is basically impossible today. A modern defense would have the primary defender sit on his baseline hip, forcing him to the middle, where there would be a weakside help defender. You’re never going to see that in videos against the best known post players because that defense wasn’t legal. You can see the same thing here. An occasional late double, or a weak swipe, or maybe a second body from the closest offensive player (man, bad spacing on so many of these), but no modern doubles. They couldn’t legally do more than that. Another thing you don’t really see is fronting, which they couldn’t do because there was no weakside defender to help if you got beat.

Against non-post players, just watch this video. This is a fantastic breakdown of what I’ve written about here, with a lot of video and quotes about how the defense changes really sunk non-post players. Think of every drive you’ve seen that ends in the ball getting knocked away by a secondary defender. There’s no such thing as a 1-on-1 drive or play anymore. Defenses work as a team, and you have to be aware of defenders that could be coming from anywhere. It’s much harder to be a good iso player because help can come on time and can come from anywhere, which are huge changes.

All of the people quoted above who said that the defense changes would only hurt the product were correct – there needed to be further rule changes to open up the game, and techniques needed to be developed to bust zones. These days, you will very rarely see true zone defenses, with Rick Carlisle being one of the very few coaches I’m aware of who still keeps it in his bag of tricks. But tempo and movement are back, incredible athletic feats are back, and ratings and interest are up. They got it right! Eventually!

Recent drafts have featured players who were praised for their abilities in these situations, and they have predictably struggled, because while players can still find themselves in these situations, they are few and far between. It’s not bad to have the skills, but they are no longer primary, game-changing skills. The next AI or the next Shaq can’t exist, because the defenses they faced at their most dominant don’t exist.

It’s simply long past time to adjust analysis of these players. Judge them by their abilities in the modern game, not a game that simply doesn’t exist anymore.

DYBD: Putting the “Done” in One-and-Done

(This article initially appeared at LibertyBallers and is reproduced here for completeness only.)

Hey folks, welcome to the first official collaboration between Don Yates and Buster Ducks. If you don’t know us, we’re both long-winded, statistically minded draftniks. Don typically posts here in the LB Fanposts, Buster typically posts on his website, BusterDucks.com, or at DeepishThoughts.com. We’re trying this out for the first time, so suggestions are welcome, and if you want us to cover a topic, you can comment down below or you can tweet us, @DonYatesNBA and @BusterDucks.

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2016: The Big Board

(This article initially appeared at DeepishThoughts and is reproduced here for completeness only.)


I lied. Before I get to the Big Board, I’m going to include here a whole bunch of stuff that I’ve written over the course of this draft series and some other information so that this is at all understandable.

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